Destruction and settlement norms as determinants of conflict: An evolutionary perspective

This paper studies conflict in a simple bargaining framework using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach. Our findings suggest that a player does not always regard the winning probability as an acceptable settlement rule. He accepts a division according to winning probability when the destruction caused to him in conflict is more than a threshold, which in turn depends on cost of conflict to the opponent and the size of the population. Further, our analysis shows that the norms with positive weight to disagreement payoff are effective against conflict, and incentivize peace. Contrary to the findings of extant studies carried out in finite population evolutionary game setting, the settlement possibility set is identical under both ESS and Nash equilibrium in our model with settlement norms.     

Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement

After a long debate on wine import tariffs, the Italian Parliament rejected the Spanish-Italian trade agreement on 17 December 1905. This decision left Spain and Italy without a bilateral trade treaty for an entire decade. In the literature, broader political issues and local interests are alternatively indicated as the main drivers of the rejection. Based on a new database which collects economic and political variables (including MPs personal features) and using a probit model, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of the vote. Results show that constituency interests had a role in determining the result of the vote on the trade treaty. Moreover, constituency interests were also important for the “vote switchers”, i.e. those MPs that supported the overall government policy stance in the first round, but opposed the Spanish-Italian trade agreement in the second.     

Organizational Design,Competition, and Financial Exchanges

We investigate the incentives for vertical and horizontal integration in the financial securities service industry. In a model with two exchanges and two central securities depositories (CSDs), we find that decentralized decisions might lead to privately and socially inferior industry equilibria with vertical integration of both CSDs with their respective exchanges. Allowing for horizontal integration of CSDs avoids privately inferior industry equilibria. However, we observe too little horizontal integration from the social perspective. We link our results to recent regulatory and institutional developments such as the emergence of multilateral trading facilities, over-the-counter regulation, and financial harmonization.     

Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology

We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology. Whereas policy coordination is not necessary for symmetric players, it matters for asymmetric players; however, this fails in the absence of transfers. By contrast, with a transfer scheme, asymmetry may be an asset for cooperation. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of self‐enforcing agreements. Asymmetric distributions of autarky public good provision levels (also representing asymmetric interests in cooperation) that are positively skewed tend to be conducive to the stability of agreements. We show that under such conditions, even a coalition including all players can be stable. However, asymmetries that foster stability (instability) tend to be associated with low (high) gains from cooperation.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

山岭隧道洞口浅层滑坡处治关键技术研究

受地形地质条件、工程经济以及勘察深度等因素的制约,山岭重丘区隧道不可避免地会受到各种不良地质灾害的影响.为解决隧道穿越洞口浅埋段滑坡体的施工安全问题,以乐业至百色高速公路永乐隧道工程为研究背景,针对其地形地质条件及滑坡体情况,结合洞内变形与滑坡体变形相互作用机理,对隧道穿越洞口浅埋段滑坡体施工关键技术进行研究,并针对性地提出"洞外加固处治+洞内严格控制沉降"的综合处治方案.实践结果表明,本隧道工程穿越洞口浅层滑坡体的施工过程安全顺利,采取的施工控制措施方案实施效果良好.     

Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

外债管理的国际经验与启示

本文研究了发达经济体（美、欧、澳、韩）和发展中经济体（俄、印）的外债发展历史和外债管理实践，并基于外债管理的国际经验提供可行性建议，旨在为加快推进我国的外债管理体制改革提供有益借鉴。     

论风景名胜区特许经营合同

风景名胜区特许经营合同属于行政合同，首先具有公法性，同时也兼具私法的特征，公法原理和部分私法原理均是其存在的法理基础。风景名胜区特许经营合同的基本内容必须体现它的法律性质，在强调公共利益至上的基础上，将公共利益与被特许人追求经济利益的权利相统一，依据经济利益平衡原则来确定合同双方的权利和义务。     

商检条款不容忽视——如何防范外商利用商品质量问题拖欠货款

商检条款是进出口贸易合同中的一项重要条款,然而又往往是买卖双方在订立合同时容易忽略的条款。本文阐述了商检条款的重要作用,订立商检条款所涉及到的主要问题,并提出了完善商检约定规避外贸风险的建议。